Which party are “we” bringing food to, Judith?

27 comments on “Which party are “we” bringing food to, Judith? ”

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1. UncookedSelachimorpha 1

   2 February 2024 at 4:02 pm

   Reducing the desperate struggle for survival by the Ukrainian people to a russian propaganda attack angle ("US proxy combatants") casts a shadow over everything else Mike writes here, to me.
   • Mike Smith 1.1

     2 February 2024 at 10:16 pm

     US Deputy Secretary of State Victoria Nuland has just been in Kyiv in the last few days. The Kyiv Independent reported:

     U.S. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Victoria Nuland arrived in Kyiv on Jan. 31, said U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine Bridget Brink.

     "Today we will meet government leaders, veterans, and civil society to underscore our shared commitment to defeating Russian aggression in Ukraine," Brink wrote on the social media platform X.

     Nuland has had a long history of working in Ukraine, becoming the U.S.'s point person in Kyiv following the 2014 EuroMaidan Revolution and the subsequent beginning of Russia's war on Ukraine.

     The most likely purpose of her visit was to hose down the attempts by President Zelensky to sack the more popular General Zaluzhny, as disaffection with the state of the war for Ukrainians and the attempts at forced mobilisation grow.

     Nuland also played a role in the Euromaidan revolution, not reported by the Independent, giving out cookies on the Maidan. She was also recorded plotting to intervene in the election following Yanukovych's ouster, telling the then US ambassador "Yats (Yatsenyuk) should be the guy that goes in." And Biden was ok with it.

     The US has taken and continues to take a very strong interest in what happens in Ukraine.
     • UncookedSelachimorpha 1.1.1

       3 February 2024 at 12:51 am

       "The US has taken and continues to take a very strong interest in what happens in Ukraine."

       But what you said was "US proxy combatants", which is a far cry from that. You attempt to deny an entire suffering nation's people of agency, with such slander.

       Ukraine is suffering terrible losses in russia's brutal and unprovoked invasion, but do amazingly well militarily, all things considered. Are Ukrainian's happy about any of it? Of course not. The best and only solution is for russia to withdraw its criminal military back to its own borders.

       I’m getting off the topic of your post so I’ll desist – but casual slander of victims, on behalf of a fascist state, irritates me.
       • Ghostwhowalks 1.1.1.1

         3 February 2024 at 8:37 am

         Nuland used to work for VP Dick Cheney from 2003 -5 where she was an major influencer for US Iraq invasion. After that job she became US Ambassador to Nato, where her role was getting Nato nations involved in the US invasion in Afghanistan.

         No matter the US Administration at the time this "Russian specialist' at the heart of the Government seems to be involved.
         • SPC 1.1.1.1.1

           3 February 2024 at 11:04 am

           NATO forces were in Afghanistan before 2003.

           You may be confusing their involvement with the formation of ISAF.

           From August 2003, NATO led the UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)

           https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_8189.htm
           • Ghostwhowalks 1.1.1.1.1.1

             5 February 2024 at 4:47 pm

             Your link says 'from Aug 2003' not before .

             Individual countries who just happened to belong to nato was the earlier involvement. In practice the US ran the pre Nato and Nato involvement with some sort of nominal german or turkish general or such
             “ISAF command originally rotated among different nations every six months. However, there was tremendous difficulty securing new lead nations. To solve the problem, the command was turned over indefinitely to NATO in Aug 2003.
             https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Security_Assistance_Force

             Its is of course a smoke and mirrors why they were even involved outside Natos defined area . The truth was the US just twisted their arms to make it look ‘international’
2. Res Publica 2

   2 February 2024 at 4:32 pm

   What is not mentioned is the purpose of AUKUS. It is clearly aimed at China, and its intent is aggressive

   Happily agree with the first point. Feel the second is absolute bonkers.

   One of my pet peeves as a leftist is the paucity of intelligent, thoughtful discussion of foreign affairs. Instead of analysis, we get dished up bullshit like this: serving after serving of shitty, trite, lazy "America bad" wishcasting that pines for a geopolitical reality that never existed.

   And all for what? So we can feel all edgy and cool because we're speaking "truth" (if you count still whining about the Iraq war as truth) to power?

   Yes – the US has done some genuinely awful things and we're definitely right to hold them to account for them. And be skeptical of their motives. But to imagine every single alliance and foreign policy choice the US, Australia and the UK has made is the result of imperialism and aggression is just stupid and wrong.

   The reality is, as a small nation, we're going to be forced to pick a side in the geopolitical standoff between China and the US. And it's only natural that both sides see it coming and are preparing for it.

   Si vis pacem, para bellum
   • Mike Smith 2.1

     2 February 2024 at 10:34 pm

     That's precisely the point – we are being forced to pick a side. That means we do not have an independent foreign policy. Like most of the rest of the Asia Pacific, we would rather not have to do so.

     And for the US, AUKUS has other benefits besides military expenditure, spelled out by Deputy Secretary of State to be Kurt Campbell:

     But for a relationship often shrouded in remembrance of past sacrifice, this futuristic ambition has implications, largely ignored, for Australian sovereignty.

     Its most pungent manifestation came with a recent comment which was first aired by former prime minister Malcolm Turnbull and widely attributed to President Biden’s Asia ‘tsar’, Kurt Campbell. Campbell described the AUKUS agreement as “getting Australia off the fence. We have them locked in now for the next 40 years”.

     https://www.afr.com/policy/foreign-affairs/does-getting-australia-off-the-fence-mean-dragged-into-war-in-asia-20221210-p5c5aa

     I don't think it wise to get locked in to a declining power.
     • Dennis Frank 2.1.1

       3 February 2024 at 6:46 am

       we are being forced to pick a side. That means we do not have an independent foreign policy.

       Your thesis seems valid on the basis of the precautionary principle, yet is somewhat premature. US playing hegemon is normal geopolitics, China playing wannabe hegemon is a recent trend, so pressure is building situationally. Potential for crisis is relative to how paranoid any observer wants to be.

       So Luxon wants to side with the good guys as per tradition, despite his operational constraint of a kiwi public that has little enthusiasm for such antiquated posturing.

       If our geopolitical context were actually binary (like the Cold War), we would likely regard Luxon's western reflex as sensible. However our geopolitical context is now multipolar, so non-alignment with the relic western stance is more sensible.

       Therefore I reckon any pressure from Oz & the US to align us will have to build further over a long time to become effective in preventing us maintaining an independent foreign policy. Unless events precipitate change…
3. SPC 3

   2 February 2024 at 7:34 pm

   AUKUS 2/11 has nothing to do with the nuclear submarine deal between -Oz-UK-US.
   • Ghostwhowalks 3.1

     3 February 2024 at 8:39 am

     'Nothing to do ?'

     The nuclear subs is just accidentally its founding document then
     • SPC 3.1.1

       3 February 2024 at 11:00 am

       There is nothing about nuclear subs in AUKUS 2.

       Claiming a link between it and the sub deal is like saying because we have a defence alliance with Oz, we are in a nuclear alliance with the USA.
4. Paul Govan 4

   4 February 2024 at 2:51 am

   Please watch Professor Jeffrey Sachs(Feb 2, 2024):

   https://www.youtube.com/live/U_yN_zE_FCo?si=wLecKkvXQA6XnQPH

   – he covers pretty much the whole gamut in just 32 minutes: Russia-Ukraine-NATO, Israel-Gaza, Imran Khan/Pakistan etc – meticulously joining key cause-effect-solution dots and focusing especially on what all of these major ongoing geopolitical issues and events have in common US-wise. All very pertinent re NZ's mighty AUKUS aspirations..

   (It'll be pretty outrageous but unsurprising and telling if Professor Sachs doesn't emerge – at the very least – as a top contender for a Nobel Peace Prize in the next year or two..)

   Paul G
5. lprent 5

   4 February 2024 at 5:47 pm

   Nuclear-propelled submarines patrolling off the coast of China are offensive weapons, as are the long-range US bombers now permanently based in Australia’s Northern Territory.

   The likelihood of Australian subs, nuclear or otherwise patrolling off the coast of China is pretty damn low. The problem with diesel/electric boats has been obvious for a long time. Their range is far too short for the kinds of missions that are required of the Australian navy because they operate in the Pacific and Indian oceans far from bases.

   The Collins diesel/electrics class are long range subs. Probably some of the best by the numbers in the world, that have a massive area to cover. Because of the size of the Australia, they barely have the range to get around the coast from their base in Perth. They have an endurance of 70 days submerged and a range of 9000 nautical miles snorting (and vunerable). The circumference of Australia is 25,760 kilometers or roughly 14,000 nautical miles.

   When you start adding in the vast Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of 8.2 million square kilometres, the need for a propulsion system better than diesel-electric alternative just for the control of their own territory is pretty damn obvious.

   You can dig this out of wikipedia in a a few minutes

   Similarly stationing B52s in Darwin has the same kind of range issues. Sure they can fly 14,000 km without refuelling (and with limited payloads). That would be within the combat range to the coast of China or Taiwan. A straight-line distance from Darwin to Shenzhan or Taiwan is about 4300km which is pushing it for a return trip combat and would take a long time. Not to mention that to not fly over national territories is likely to push that out to more like 6000km each way.

   Especially since they could do the same operations from B52s based in allied bases like Guam, Philippines, Japan, etc and probably do so with fighter and air defence suppression.

   I realise that the left peace movements are more than a little retarded about questions of military capabilities. But I tend to chalk that up to spending far too much time sucking up ideological thought and insufficient time reading history. Just as I find teh conservative tendencies of wedging their heads up each other arses in a line of repeating the thought that it con't happen here – because I want a tax break.

   But really, this post is more fantasy than reality.

   What the Aussie military is in range of is the movement of the PLA to forward bases in places like the disputed Spratly Islands. And vice versa. So they are developing a capability to deal with potential threats from there. Where they have previously mainly looked at the 'local' military capabilities from Indonesia, Vietnam, Philippines, New Zealand (of course they look at us. We also look at them), and even the US (and them).

   Now they are factoring in capabilities of the China as they move military bases and capabilities closer.

   As is pointed out in the article "When they come over here" about the increasing capabilities and frequency of Chinese vessels and aircraft down towards Australia.

   When Beijing directs the PLA to establish and demonstrate a persistent physical presence in Australia’s periphery, the tyranny of distance will take on a totally different meaning for Australians, and the isolation will no longer be so splendid.

   The sobering reality is that projecting air and sea power into Australia’s periphery on a regular basis, while not without its challenges, is relatively straightforward. From China’s bases in the Spratly Islands to Darwin is approximately 3,000km as the crow flies. Sailing or flying via the Makassar and Lombok straits – one of multiple international passages through the Indonesian archipelago – pushes the distance to over 4,000km.

   Departing from the Spratly Island bases, a ship or task group averaging 10-15 knots could cover this distance in a bit over a week. In the next decade, such a task group could include aircraft carriers of similar tonnage and capacity to the US Navy’s Nimitz or new Ford class carriers.

   In the military, threats are largely assessed in terms of capability rather than intent or opportunity.

   The reason is that military capabilities typically take a lot of time and effort to acquire – usually requiring decades of work.

   Intent can change rapidly. It often only requires a power shift in the political space of a nation. Opportunities are often even more fleeting.

   So China puts bases and starts acquiring military capabilities that could potentially support blockade of attack possibilities on Australia and Australian trade routes, and the Australia will start to look for ways to increase its capabilities to prevent bad intent or fleeting opportunities to be attacked.

   It doesn't matter that much if it is a rise in the capabilities for piracy in the Malay Archipelago, missiles in the Red Sea, or China using their "coast guard" or militia "fishing boats" over disputed islands in the South China seas, or even fishing fleets in the EEZ. Military and government in countries like Australia and New Zealand will look at those capabilities and those of their allies for their defence and judge them against the capabilities of everyone else, including their trading partners and allies as well as anyone with whom they have disagreements with.

   Everyone with half a brain has read the history of what happens when capabilities for defence start being built too late to handle the capabilities that the next foolhardy populist or failing dictator or coup leader might get their hands on.

   Of course China doesn't exactly reduce suspicion of their intent by their recent running of trade threat campaigns against Australia (and regularly warning NZ as well) and their behaviour towards smaller nations over reefs in the SCS.
   • Mike Smith 5.1

     6 February 2024 at 11:56 am

     Oh for God's sakes this is patronising crap. Leftist peace activists and I happily count myself one do read history, lots of it. We also read maps, and primary sources from all sides. And we are not unaware of military capability, with so many examples of it's failings active as we speak. But to infer that china's militarising of reefs in its eponymous near seas, surrounded as it is by US military bases, implies any intent to invade Australia or New Zealand, is purest bollocks.
     • SPC 5.1.1

       6 February 2024 at 1:17 pm

       It is so blatantly a statement of the will to make a territorial claim, without regard to international law, at the expense of ASEAN nations to demonstrate who has regional hegemon.

       And if Oz and New Zealand accept this, because of trade with China, then we have abandoned collective security to that regional hegemon.

       The Chinese navy bullies ASEAN nation boats from fishing within their 200 miles economic zones (what next claiming all the mineral resources in the area). And then sends its own boats out as spy vessels while buying up right of access to fishing zones of Pacific Islands.
     • lprent 5.1.2

       7 February 2024 at 5:13 pm

       The patronising crap is that you obviously you never read my comment and turned you brain on enough to try to understand it.

       But to infer that china's militarising of reefs in its eponymous near seas, …any intent to invade Australia or New Zealand, is purest bollocks.

       I certainly didn't say that. BTW: I missed out the irrelevant sidetrack for compulsive reflexives in the middle.

       I will highlight what I did say because clearly you either didn't bother to read it or didn't understand it. What I said was

       In the military, threats are largely assessed in terms of capability rather than intent or opportunity.

       The reason is that military capabilities typically take a lot of time and effort to acquire – usually requiring decades of work.

       Intent can change rapidly. It often only requires a power shift in the political space of a nation. Opportunities are often even more fleeting.

       I didn't talk about intent as being important – because it isn't. I didn't mention invasion at all. What I talked about was that additional military capabilities that having those SCS military bases has.

       In other words, it simply doesn't matter what China's current intent is, or what the intent of their build-up of military capability has been in the past or for the future. The only thing that may matters is that they have that military capability and are continuing to increase it.

       That is because the military capability is what any military planner has to look at when planning their own defences or offensive capabilities.

       Intent is way way way down on the factors that are thought about. Almost to the point of being irrelevant when you are looking at decades long programs to improve capabilities to counter those of other nations.

       Even if you assumed that the current Chinese administration had absolutely no intent of using those bases for military action. That is irrelevant – it is only the capabilities that count. Even if you also take an enormous jump of faith and assume those bases were only there in support of their claims to those islands and associated EEZ. That is a big jump as currently China is using them to pressure Vietnam, Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia, and Taiwan over the Spratley Islands to name the claims and counter claims over just one set of islands. Then that still makes absolutely no difference to any military planners.

       A change of administration or even policy shift in China would be all that was required to change the intended use of their military bases in the SCS. Implementing a policy change can happen within a very short time frame, months or at the worst a few years if the capability is already present.

       It simply doesn't matter what the bloody current intent of why the capabilities of PLA and its associated militias in the SCS were increased. What matters are the possible operations that those capabilities could be used for.

       What matters is that the China PLA and associated militias have been building military bases that are 400 or more nautical miles (~740km) from their coast. Which means that they are at least that much closer than previously to Australia and its local alliances, trade and security treaties.

       Close enough by air that even 1950s air frames have a capability for attack against a large chunk of Australia and its trade routes. Close enough that you only have to blink for a week and and you'll miss a force that appears to blockade harbours.

       Those are capabilities. Soon enough there will also be PLA capabilities to move whole naval task forces south because of how they building their navy.

       It doesn't matter what the intent is. Intents can change rapidly. The fact is that there is a capability in existence means Australia or us or any state will start to move to counter the capability to ensure that if the intent changes, then there is a capability to deal with it. .

       Currently Australia doesn't have a capability to effectively defend or strike back against the launch platforms for those kinds of possible movements. So they are gaining it. Not only with the PLA who are the most obvious people with this capability, but also for anyone else. Also because the tyranny of distance is diminishing rapidly for conventional weapons.

       Sure that is before the current foreshadowed expansions of capacity and technical capabilities of the PLA like longer-ranged bombers, long range missiles, and naval forces capable of longer ranged missions. But the same defences of the AUKUS including tier 2 will defend against those as well.

       Like all other nations that are in the range of that military capability will be adjusting their defence stances in response to those SCS PLA military bases.

       Like putting in those SCS PLA military bases, It will take decades to implement the new or expanded military capabilities.

       AUKUS is planned to have their RAN SSN-A in service in the 2040s. The tier 2 tech of AUKUS of computer tech, hyper-sonic and anti-hyper-sonic missiles and radars will be faster, but will only be completed in the 2030s.

       Temporary expedients like providing basing for B52s from an ally provide a more immediate deterrent capability against changes in intent.

       However by starting now on AUKUS and other capability upgrades. Then having a counter-capability will still be way faster than trying to do the same capability upgrades if the current intents or administration changes sometime within the next decade.

       Ummm.. let me work on an historical example for you.

       One that you can probably relate to so you can see teh difference between the timescales of capabilities and intents.
     • lprent 5.1.3

       7 February 2024 at 6:53 pm

       If you'd actually dug into military history, there is one classic case about the difference between capability and intent that should be obvious to you and that I'll use because of its relevance.

       Consider Force Z. On of the larger screwups in the British Commonwealth war against the Japanese empire in 1941. Had a direct 840+deaths and probably way more indirect deaths bearing in mind its effect on the Malay campaign.

       As late as the 1923 the British Empire was a military ally of the Japanese Empire by treaty. It was close enough that in 1921 a technical mission went from the UK to Japan to assist them to developing naval air forces, including flying lessons and advice about how to build aircraft carriers.

       There was no known documented Japanese planning to attack British held locations until the early 1940. In less than two decades after 1923, the Japanese by 1941 had accumulated the capability to consolidate a 6 fleet carrier force (by far the largest to that time) to attack Pearl harbour and further naval air forces to attack Malaysia and Thailand – at the same time.

       Sure like every other idea, some ideas about attacks on the British empire was bounced around inside the Japanese military in the very late 1930s. But it was only planned for in early 1940 and adopted in late 1940 as a possible strategy. It actually happened in late 1941.

       It took the Japanese empire two decades to go from not having any aircraft carrier capability to having about the most modern and concentrated naval airforce with an ability to concentrate fleet carriers to take out pearl harbour.

       However the change of intent from not planning to attack the British empire to doing it was just 2 years.

       It was similar but longer for the planning and intent to attack Pearl Harbour. The planning for that appears to have started around 1938 after the US hardened its sanctions related to the second Sino-China war.

       The British had actually considered war plans against Japan earlier in the 1930s, mostly about protecting their bases in China as Japan was pressuring fro concessions. But also rough defensive plans based around Singapore and Ceylon and trade routes. However those were based on conventional

       Between 1921 and 1941, the British hadn't significantly developed their aero-naval force capabilities. They only started developing the post-WW1 aircraft carrier classes in 1934 (Ark Royal) and 1937 (Illustrious class) as part of their response to Italy capabilities and intentions around the Med.

       All of the deployed British naval aero capabilities were vastly inferior to the Japanese. Sure they succeeded at Taranto flying obsolete biplanes at 90mph. But that was in late 1940. The success there unleashed a wave of British carrier naval capacity building that came to fruition years later.

       At the outbreak of the war with Japan, there were only about 5 operational British fleet carriers. Despite having a large area to control and after losing 3 carriers in Europe by Nov 1941 (Courageous, Glorious, and Ark Royal). The Brits didn't have the military capability to cover their heavy naval forces and critical merchant convoys.

       They had only a single fleet carrier Hermes (launched in 1919) based in Ceylon that was tasked with defending the trade routes, 3 were in the Atlantic covering convoys, and one in the Med covering the transport line to Malta.

       A battleship, battle-cruiser and a few destroyers were dispatched to Singapore in late 1941. On arrival renamed as Force Z.

       After the invasion, British Commonwealth air-cover was effectively destroyed outside of Singapore. Hardly surprising when the Japanese had 800 mostly modern aircraft in support across the region (mostly initially based in Vichy Indo-China) with good intelligence against 250 Commonwealth aircraft of varying ages and support.

       Force Z was sent to kill troop convoys. It was without a aircraft carrier (no carriers available). Because of a poor intelligence communications capability (and probably due to Japanese spy in the worst possible place in the British military), they didn't know until long after dispatch of Force Z that the RAF had little to no remaining air-cover outside of Singapore. The Japanese had blown the land based force away in concentrated attacks, and had captured and used additional airfields in Malaysia and Thailand

       Force Z got destroyed by Japanese naval torpedo planes flown from land bases in northern Malaysia.

       Think on that. The Japanese had a military capability to not only have built sufficient modern naval aircraft to not only over-pack the attack force on Pearl Harbour, but also to cover the islands of Japan. And they also had sufficient to land base near the front of their invasion force on the southern force. Torpedo planes aren't useful on ground forces.

       They had the production capability to largely maintain the supply of naval aircraft despite a increasingly effective submarine blockage until the B29 strategic bombing started in Nov 1944. Most of their naval aircraft were land-based. They were ideal for island landing strips with short takeoff and landing capabilities with excellent rough landing abilities.

       Force Z capability defects like the lack of aircraft carriers weren't all of the issues.

       Force Z's surface scanning radars used for ship air-defences against torpedo bombers weren't working because they were inoperable in warm humid conditions. Even their state of the automated anti-aircraft gun dive-bombing radars were offline. A less startling oversight when you realise that this was the first time that either type of radar had been tested in the true tropics. Military capabilities developed late always have weird bugs.

       The whole of the British WW2 experience was a classic exercise in failures of understanding military capabilities.

       The UK started to half-heartily update their capabilities a decade only after 1933 initially focusing on the intent of German state. They continued to over-value intent rather mainly looking at capabilities.

       They really under-estimated the Japanese empire and what it was building in military capability. The expansionist intent of Japan was only realised after looking at the second Sino-Japanese war and as they joined the Axis, more than decade after they developed most of their naval-aero capabilities.

       None more so that than in the way that Force Z got wiped out. With at least 840 killed and innumerable indirect casualties. Because battleships could be killed relatively easily by modern air-craft without air-cover.

       All because a large change in military capabilities had been largely ignored through short-term wishful thinking about intents. But also by the British ignoring earlier largely ignoring a carrier navy (as did most navies).

       When intent became evident. Intent had a short lead time. Capabilities still took longer for the allies to build.

       With the British, they only started getting sufficient carrier capacity in 1944 to re-enter the Pacific.
6. Wei 6

   8 February 2024 at 2:37 pm

   Excellent article Mr Smith.

   I think the point is not so much the capability of Australia itself to threaten China, but its moves to embolden and enable an aggressive US empire, which surely is a threat to China.

   Australian warships have traversed the Taiwan Straits with US warships threatening China, have supported US efforts to thwart China's rightful claims to the South China Sea (claims that even the Taiwanese themselves recognise as legitimate).

   Joining with AUKUS puts us squarely in the US imperialist camp, and that does not make us safer, it puts us at greater risk of being involved in conflict. It is obviously against our economic interests. Already this government has signed us up to killing Yemenis, and now they appear hell-bent on signing us up as part of a threatening alliance towards our major trading partner.
   • Incognito 6.1

     8 February 2024 at 3:31 pm

     What a load of disinformation and twisting of words. I remind you that you’re still in Pre-Moderation and I’m keeping an eye on your comments and for good reason, it seems. This is another warning for you.
     • Wei 6.1.1

       8 February 2024 at 5:01 pm

       Where is the disinformation?
       • Incognito 6.1.1.1

         8 February 2024 at 5:23 pm

         Do not waste my time with your games.
         • Wei 6.1.1.1.1

           8 February 2024 at 5:41 pm

           Not sure if its the bit about Taiwan's claims:

           "As with China, Taiwan claims sovereignty over all the island groups in the South China Sea and jurisdiction over adjacent waters: Spratlys (Nansha), Paracel (Xisha), Pratas (Dongsha), Macclesfield Bank (Zhongsha). Taiping Island, also known as Itu Aba and various other names, is the largest formation within the Spratlys.

           Taiwan | South China Sea | Conflict and Diplomacy on the High Seas (voanews.com)
           • Incognito 6.1.1.1.1.1

             8 February 2024 at 5:51 pm

             Nope. Try again.
     • Wei 6.1.2

       8 February 2024 at 5:42 pm

       BTW the previous is post is cut and paste from a Voice of America site. Of course because it is American it won't be 'disinformation', right?
       • Incognito 6.1.2.1

         8 February 2024 at 5:52 pm

         Nope again, but nice try though.
   • SPC 6.2

     8 February 2024 at 6:05 pm

     The ROC made its modern claim in 1947 (the arrogance of UNSC membership that Russia continues in Ukraine) and are continued by PRC, the Nationalists did not walk away from them, but today Taiwan restricts itself to confronting Japan on fishing in the East China sea.

     Most discount the historical basis to China's claims – written record of discovery is not a legitimate claim of sovereignty (when the islands were not settled) and atolls are of the sea.

     They also conflict with accepted claims of a 200 mile economic zone around real (populated) territory made by other nations.

     So international rulings are, what they are.

     https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/10/24/why-does-china-claim-almost-the-entire-south-china-sea

     https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/how-china-bending-rules-south-china-sea

     https://spectator.clingendael.org/en/publication/still-waters-run-deep-taiwans-south-china-sea-strategy

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