US imposes 10% tariff on NZ imports

Written By: - Date published: 1:43 pm, April 3rd, 2025 - 52 comments
Categories: Donald Trump, Economy, Free Trade, trade, us politics - Tags:

While 10% is at the lower end of this unjustified tax, it is very serious for our whole NZ economy.

The US is our 2nd largest trading partner taking NZ $9billion of trade.

Australia is getting the same 10%. But China its over 30%. That’s the 3 largest economies upon which we rely having big extra costs on them. 

It also deliberately cools consumer demand across the US, the world’s largest consumer.

In my opinion this impact will be similar to the COVID impact: a global economic cooling that takes 2 years to go through.

Because it will take at least a year for sharemarket analysts and businesses investing plans to figure, shares markets will stay down for a while.

That means our Kiwisaver accounts are down. And stay down. Maybe even longer for us to plan retirement or first home mortgages.

What is PM Luxon’s plan for this? He knew it was coming. 

As with Ardern’s crises, the leadership moment for our PM is now, today.

52 comments on “US imposes 10% tariff on NZ imports ”

  1. tc 1

    Suck up to trump and hope for the best appears the strategy from the mainstream managed pollies so far.

    • francesca 1.1

      Where is the WTO in all of this ?

      The US is a signed up member

      • SPC 1.1.1

        It is time to replace the WTO, with the original plan, an ITO – and of course exclude the USA from membership.

        The WTO is on a reef, the US acted to disable its functionality.

      • Dennis Frank 1.1.2

        Google's AI has this view of the WTO failure:

        The World Trade Organization (WTO) faces criticism and is perceived as failing due to its inability to deliver significant multilateral trade liberalization, address modern trade concerns, and resolve disputes effectively, particularly regarding the inoperative Appellate Body and the influence of powerful nations

        Seems like it was a pipe-dream. If you recall Mike Moore's enthusiasm about it when he was official cheerleader, you'll wonder about what was in his pipe..

        • Incognito 1.1.2.1

          Google’s AI has this view of the WTO failure:

          Unless we’re conversing with Google’s AI here on TS what matters is what your view is.

          • Dennis Frank 1.1.2.1.1

            Tbh, I've been rather bemused by the drift of the thing into irrelevance. I figured the Doha failure was a temporary blip. Obviously I got that wrong! I suspect that collective diagnosis will eventually form the retrospective view that it was an early precursor of the failure of neoliberalism…

            • lprent 1.1.2.1.1.1

              The US effectively and deliberately neutered the appellate tribunal. Both under Obama and killed it under Trump. However the WTO hadn't been effective at getting agreements short of the tribunal, especially after China joined. That gave the US an opening to trade the WTO (ie make it ineffective as a court) against smaller closed trading economies goodwill.

              That meant that there was no way to effectively appeal transgressions. Which made the whole thing a farce.

              There is a great article about it from Nov 2019 at the economist. I'll quote the first 4 paras as it is probably pay walled.

              It’s the end of the World Trade Organisation as we know it

              “WINTER IS COMING,” warned a Norwegian representative on November 22nd, at a meeting of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). The multilateral trading system that the WTO has overseen since 1995 is about to freeze up. On December 10th two of the judges on its appellate body, which hears appeals in trade disputes and authorises sanctions against rule-breakers, will retire—and an American block on new appointments means they will not be replaced. With just one judge remaining, it will no longer be able to hear new cases.

              The WTO underpins 96% of global trade. By one recent estimate, membership of the WTO or General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), its predecessor, has boosted trade among members by 171%. When iPhones move from China to America, or bottles of Scotch whisky from the European Union to India, it is the WTO’s rules that keep tariff and non-tariff barriers low and give companies the certainty they need to plan and invest.

              The system is supposed to be self-reinforcing. Mostly, countries follow the WTO’s rules. But if one feels another has transgressed, then instead of starting a one-on-one trade spat it can file a formal dispute. If the WTO’s ruling displeases either party, it can appeal. The appellate body’s judgments pack a punch. If the loser fails to bring its trade rules into compliance, the winner can impose tariffs up to the amount the judges think the rule-breaking cost it. It is that punishment that deters rule breaking in the first place.

              It is no surprise that President Donald Trump has axed these foreign arbiters, given his general distaste for internationally agreed rules. On November 12th he declared himself “very tentative” on the WTO. But the problems run far deeper than dislike of multilateral institutions. They stem from a breakdown in trust over the way international law should work, and the more general failure of the WTO’s negotiating arm. Had the Americans felt that they could negotiate away their grievances, resentment towards the appellate body might not have built up. But with so many members reluctant to liberalise, including smaller countries fearful of opening up to China, that has been impossible.

              The reason for the judges retirement was (as I remember it) because of a arbitrary rule about retirement ages. But the cause was due to having vetos on nominees.

              I suspect we will have a new round after the current US-led trade wars die down. But I think that both the US, China, and possibly India and Russia should be excluded. Just medium to small economies who are more likely to be interested in free and fair trade and less interested in indulging in dick-waving contests.

              The large economies add nothing but problems when it comes to trade agreements.

              • Dennis Frank

                Cool, thanks for clarifying – and damn good idea about a new round & doing it to an innovative design for more equity!

        • SPC 1.1.2.2

          The US exercised its dominance over the organisation to disable the inoperative Appellate Body.

      • SPC 1.1.3

        It is also a partner in NAFTA and their FTA with Australia, but with Trump none of that matters.

    • Res Publica 1.2

      “Suck up to Trump and hope for the best” sounds bleak — because it is.

      But it’s also the only option left when you’re dealing with a reality-TV presidency that treats global trade like a roulette wheel and foreign policy like a WWE storyline.

      You can’t negotiate with a man who sees tariffs not as economic tools but as applause lines. You can’t appeal to consistency when the ideology shifts with the crowd size.

      And you definitely can’t rely on institutions like the WTO to constrain a superpower run by a senile egomaniac with the impulse control of a toddler on meth.

      So, what’s a small country like New Zealand supposed to do?

      Grin. Flatter. Pray that he stops at 10% and gets sidetracked.

      And meanwhile, start building diverse, resilient, and principled trade links — not because it’s easy, but because it’s the only long-term exit from chaos.

      Because Trumpian “economics” (if we’re being extremely generous with the term) isn’t really about policy.

      It’s about vibes.

      Usually bad ones.

      Until the dice land on someone else, we play nice, stall for time — and prep like hell for the next round.

      • Ad 1.2.1

        It's smart politics of Trump domestically to get all the chaos and big moves out of the way in 2025, clearing the air for the 2026 mid-terms.

        Also pretty fulsome praise by the UAW and Teamsters at the Rose Garden event today. Not even Biden got that.

        • Res Publica 1.2.1.1

          I still don’t buy into the whole “Actually, Trump is playing 5D chess, lol libtards” narrative.

          We could waste a lot of time on Kremlinology and trying to read strategy into chaos. But this feels more like a happy accident than a masterstroke.

          Or maybe some clever nudging from the grown-ups still lurking backstage. You know, the Stephen Millers, the JD Vances, the Peter Navarros. The guys who’ve made a career out of weaponising dysfunction whenever the moment presents itself.

          Let’s not confuse a lucky stumble into a win with actual strategic genius.

          And as for the sudden approbation from the gutted remains of the US working class?

          It might just be the grim satisfaction of getting exactly what they wished for. Then realising far too late what that really means.

          • Ad 1.2.1.1.1

            Agree I don't buy that either.

            Can't wait for 2026 mid-terms, and the Canadian and Australian ones in the coming months. And Bolsonaro is going to jail good job.

            The world is not buying Trump-ism, and these tariffs flatlining the global economy are an excellent revival of the memory of the dreadful Smoot-Hawley Act impact back in 1930.

            We have but a dull echo of Trumpism here, but it will still be enough to give a centre-left coalition a push upward into 2026 elections.

            • lprent 1.2.1.1.1.1

              The world is not buying Trump-ism, and these tariffs flatlining the global economy are an excellent revival of the memory of the dreadful Smoot-Hawley Act impact back in 1930.

              And the similar stupidities in other economies in the later 1920s and early 1930s.

              We're probably going to find out if the international economic system is stable enough to weather another round of political stupidity impacting into finely balanced economic systems.

              Coming so soon after the economic supply chain issues highlighted in the pandemic, it wouldn't surprise me if the world starts sliding into recession or even a sustained depression.

              • Res Publica

                And now that their golden boy’s burning it all down, all the neolibs will have to come crawling back to Daddy Keynes — soot-faced and empty-handed.

                • Dennis Frank

                  A binary flip is feasible but has to get an element of novelty injected as warp factor to capture the optimal potential for a better future, so I see it as a test of collective intelligence in geopolitics.

                  In theory – as in evolutionary theory (adaption to survive) – the hegemon is in the process of subsiding into a multipolar configuration. The triad humanity has selected to administer this transition is 3 authoritarian leaders doing total control as operational stance. How this plays out given that indeterminacy is inherent in any complex system is anyone's guess but a synchronous grasp of the best way forward can happen quite naturally, even if the troika must feel their way awhile at first.

                  A summit could be planned for next season perhaps. Everyone's eyes will be on the stock market tomorrow. Panic seems likely!

                • Phillip ure

                  @ r.p…

                  Heh..!

          • SPC 1.2.1.1.2

            Trump went to hogWharton School. It was founded by the owner of Bethlehem Steel (pig iron), who made his money via some nickel and dime monopoly – supplying minerals to the US government. In his old age Joseph Wharton got to meet the Kaiser.

            Wharton believed in a tariff wall around the USA and oligarchy (monopoly wealthy elite) within it.

            In the 1980's, Trump was influenced by the rise of Japan in trade and by 2000 was effectively a supporter of Buchanan – economic and foreign policy isolationist. His 1990's affair and various bankruptcy's blocked an earlier go at the presidency – he used "The Apprentice" to recover from all that.

            He would have China and the EU/Germany as new "Japan" threats, not Russia. He would have seen the presidency (China into the WTO) enabling and corporations profiting from China's rise as anti-American.

            His economics are simplistic – nationalist. A bit like locals here with the "we are OK at 10%", he would think the rest of the world will be worse and the American relatively better (largest single market and increased supply and demand for local goods).

            He wants domestic growth – the USA has a significant and out of control government budget deficit and large public debt.

            If it does not work – well he has form, as to managing/surviving bankruptcy. He would then call his desperate financial reform "genius"***.

            His dodgy figures around trade (excluding services) – he would see like tax, sharp practice***. And no one would put tariffs on American military exports.

            But if the world was annoyed enough, it could go beyond reducing buying of their military exports (given they are prone to perfidy – kill switches, withholding parts and intelligence blocks) by allowing generic replacements for more than drugs (… IP … tech).

      • weka 1.2.2

        And meanwhile, start building diverse, resilient, and principled trade links —

        What would that look like?

        • Res Publica 1.2.2.1

          Probably deeper trade integration with the EU, Canada, Japan, and South Korea: stable (ish) democracies with semi-coherent institutions and at least a vague recollection of what multilateralism is supposed to look like. Sure, the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy remains a Kafkaesque subsidy labyrinth, and Japan’s agricultural lobby makes Federated Farmers look like amateurs by comparison, but at least these countries have a planning horizon longer than the next 30 seconds and aren’t making economic policy on the hoof.

          At the same time, New Zealand needs to move beyond legacy thinking. Diversification isn’t a buzzword. It’s an existential strategy. Southeast Asia, Latin America, and Africa aren’t “emerging”, they’re asserting. That’s where growth is. That’s where future trade resilience lives. And if we’re not there shaping the rules and showing up with more than just a milk powder pitch, someone else will be. Probably with fewer qualms, deeper pockets, and a whole of armed force.

          This means leaning into smart plurilateralism: leveraging the CPTPP (and potentially nudging it toward a greener, more digitally coherent version), strengthening ASEAN and Pacific ties, and reimagining our Africa engagement beyond high-level niceties into real investment and standards alignment. It means supporting frameworks like the Digital Economy Partnership Agreement (DEPA) and pushing carbon accountability into trade protocols. Because future-facing trade isn’t just about goods anymore; it’s about data, emissions, and digital integrity.

          We should be exporting norms: data privacy regimes, transparent procurement models, trusted agri-tech in parallel with our goods. And yes, that might occasionally put us out of sync with countries that prefer opaque state capitalism or who consider digital surveillance a sovereign right. But that’s exactly why it matters.

          Because hedging against volatility means baking our values — climate action, labour rights, anti-corruption — into the trade architecture. Not out of moral vanity, but because it’s the only form of predictability we can still build in a system being destabilised by actors who think “rules-based” is for suckers.

          And let’s be honest: this won’t always be economically optimal in the short term. Some deals will be slower. Some partners will walk away. But those that stick will be partnerships with ballast. The kind that survive political mood swings, Twitter meltdowns, and senile strongmen with nukes.

          Because when global trade turns into a cage match, and the U.S. starts playing Russian roulette with global stability, you don’t win by trying to be louder. You win by being, move over Madeleine Albright, indispensable.

          We may not be the biggest, but in a world this unstable, being principled, trusted, and consistent is the sharpest edge we’ve got

          • Dennis Frank 1.2.2.1.1

            the sharpest edge

            I couldn't help it, I immediately thought of Tweedledumb & Tweedledumber, our airhead leaders provided by democracy. Such a downer after reading your exellent appraisal! frown

            Can Aotearoa flush out someone able to combine geopolitics and trade policy for us? We need to get an adult into the room asap. With a sharp edge!

            • Res Publica 1.2.2.1.1.1

              Can Aotearoa flush out someone able to combine geopolitics and trade policy for us?

              I think one of the core weaknesses in the way Aotearoa approaches politics is that it generally doesn’t cultivate or reward deep experience in trade or foreign policy. We don’t have the population size or political culture that supports specialist career tracks in geopolitics. Or, at least not in Parliament.

              It’s a structural issue: small country, geographically isolated, and often more focused on domestic consensus than strategic calculations.

              As a result, those conversations get outsourced, mostly to the career wonks in MFAT, who quietly carry the weight of our international positioning. Which is fine, until you need political leadership that understands what’s at stake and able to respond to the global economy being upended practically overnight.

              We’ve got clever people. What we lack is a system that consistently elevates them into visible, influential leadership roles. The closest we've had in recent years might be David Parker (who came in without foreign policy credentials but learned fast) and Tim Groser, who had bona fide policy chops but was effectively sidelined by the bigger personalities in Key's cabinet.

          • weka 1.2.2.1.2

            thanks! What do you think about that going up as a Guest Post?

  2. AB 2

    What will Luxon do?

    In the short-term send Todd McLay to Washington to pledge fealty to the Trump regime and beg for an exemption – which we won't get and will cause Washington to despise us even more and feel inclined to kick us again over Pharmac or GST.

    In the medium-term he will believe that the industries affected by these tariffs need the gifts of lower wages and weaker regulation (environmental, H&S, employment, emissions) in order to stay competitive. That is, he will use the crisis as a reason to double-down on what he is already doing now, has always wanted to do, and will always do under all imaginable sets of economic conditions.

    What should he do?

    Provide the industries that will be seriously affected with support for any structural adjustments or capital investments that might help, and build trading relationships and alliances with other countries also affected by the tariffs. Find ways of cutting trade dependence on the US. Get this underway asap in case the US does not return to sanity in 4 years' time.

    • Nic the NZer 2.1

      First off, we should understand what exporting is doing for the country. There is no advantage to a business of selling overseas over selling locally, both are just revenue. The main advantage to an export enabled business is picking up extra demand. Understanding this demonstrates what is going to change if these tariffs really bite.

      There is also a political ideology backing an export economy. By employing people in the export sector this diminishes the need of the country to employ people fulfilling local demand. This may sustain politics implementing a smaller public sector, more extreme wealth inequality, while insulating that agenda from additional mass domestic unemployment.

      Because of this in the event tariffs really bite this actually presents an opportunity to the government. This is to replace the fall in export demand with local demand. That could take the form of direct government purchases of useful export goods, government employment of people who leave export jobs in a locally useful way, more govt spending creating significant local demand, or a job guarantee which will soak up and employ people unemployed by the export sector (though in lower skill work). All of these replacements of external demand with local demand would raise the product created by the domestic economy directly as well as the economic standards enjoyed in NZ (real goods and services consumed in NZ).

      What would I expect to happen, none of the above. The government will say some things about finding other markets to sell to, will do nothing about it and will carry on with their pre-conceived austerity plan and hope to weather the high unemployment and weak economy at the next election. Probably some begging of the US government to remove tariffs as a cherry on top.

      • Dennis Frank 2.1.1

        Good analysis and I suspect you may be proven correct. Morons stretch to the horizon in all directions nowadays. Anykinda shit can happen & likely will…

      • Descendant Of Smith 2.1.2

        There is no advantage to a business of selling overseas over selling locally.

        Apart from higher volumes and prices. Local selling has nothing to do with local supply and demand – orchardists for instance do not sell surplus supply on local markets in order to artificially keep local prices up.

        There is certainly enough local supply in most things to bring NZ prices down.

        • Nic the NZer 2.1.2.1

          It's not clear to me how you are suggesting that selling to particular international markets affects prices set.

          I would suggest that very limited NZ demand explains quite a lot in relation to how the country works, low savings, little share market investment, few businesses developed from NZ.

          I doubt that using a lack of domestic demand to drive towards low domestic prices is a good economic strategy. The fall out from that would likely be bad for a lot of peoples employment regardless of how its achieved I think.

          • Descendant Of Smith 2.1.2.1.1

            We see it continuously stated that prices are high in New Zealand as we have to pay international prices. That logically means that we would pay less in NZ if it wasn't for higher prices fetched overseas. Therefore there is an incentive to see overseas.

            The orchardists were clear during COVID that they do not sell their overseas headed apples in the NZ market in order to keep prices up. The domestic demand is artificially deflated through both having to pay overseas prices and through controlling supply.

            Just like they do with diamonds and oil.

            AI response.

            New Zealand’s high meat and butter prices are largely due to its export-driven economy, where global markets set the price for these commodities, and the high demand for New Zealand’s products overseas, pushing up prices for domestic consumers.

    • mikesh 2.2

      he will believe that the industries affected by these tariffs need the gifts of lower wages and weaker regulation

      A UBI or negative tax rates might possibly compensate for lower wages, though Trump may see these as subsidies and increase tariffs on NZ imports accordingly.

  3. Dennis Frank 3

    According to what I heard on the radio both NZ & Oz prime ministers will not impose reciprocal tariffs (RNZ news). Roll over, play dead…

    I presume neither wants to declare the death of neoliberalism just yet. Better to wait until someone with more authority does so. Cue puzzled looks from all western political leaders as they glance around the room to see who will lead from the front.

    I agree with you re the likely effects on the economy. Not quite de-growth, but more like someone just fed it a sedate pill. Quite a strong one – enough to make it go cross-eyed & lower its head onto its paws.

  4. bwaghorn 4

    There's atleast 8 billion others humans outside of the U S , fuck trump sell our stuff to other people.

    • Ad 4.1

      Canada and India are our best new markets, andalso the markets that tariff very high against our milk exports.

      You can't flick a switch.

      • bwaghorn 4.1.1

        I reise that , nut how I would love the world's beef producers to play chicken with trump stopp all US imports of beef, which the barstard get turfed out if yanks can't eat there burgers. !!

        • joe 4.1.1.1

          bwaghorn.
          That's the whole idea.
          He wants Americans to produce their own beef and enough for their needs.
          Rather than buy it in.
          Grow America.

  5. Joe90 5

    The Heard and McDonald islands are an uninhabited Austrailan protectorate, the only people in the British Indian Ocean Territory are stationed at the U.S. base at Diego Garcia and who knows what Norfolk Isalnd and Reunion did to deserve their tariffs.

  6. SPC 6

    Trump (form)

    1.bankrupt the US government

    2.disentangle the US economy from the rest of the world.

    Reneg on debt.

  7. Ad 7

    Anyone else looking forward to Musk getting booted out of the White House, and Tesla sales never recovering?

    Won't have too long to wait now.

    Tough luck everyone who bought Tesla shares and held.

    • Dennis Frank 7.1

      No booting required, apparently:

      Musk presumably has a ticking clock on his tenure. He was hired as a special government employee, which means he can only work 130 days in a 365-day time period. “I think we will have accomplished most of the work required to reduce the deficit by a trillion dollars within that time frame,” Musk told Bret Baier of Fox News on March 27. So far DOGE is well short of that target, according to its own calculations https://apnews.com/article/trump-musk-doge-tesla-government-cuts-c47211544c5382a6207779ee95c6060b

      Re the market yo-yo, what goes down normally comes up. If you've got spare cash you could short that prospect, huh? Bet on Tesla's non-recovery. Odds oughta be good.

    • weka 7.2

      anticipatory schadenfreude is a thing.

  8. Psycho Milt 8

    OK, this comes as no surprise whatsoever: Trump’s ‘idiotic’ and flawed tariff calculations stun economists.

    “This is not serious trade policy or grand strategy,” said Tooze. “The boss hates trade deficits and his team of willing sycophants came up with a formula, however idiotic, that ticked the box.”

    The idiotic formula:

    "For each country, the White House looked up its trade in goods deficit for 2024, then divided that by the total value of imports. Trump, to be “kind”, said he would, however, offer a discount, so halved that figure."

    So, ignore any Luxon attempts to credit NZ government ministers' awesome persuasive skills for NZ only copping the 10% default. The only reason for it is that our trade surplus with the US isn't large so the default was applied to us.

  9. Sanctuary 9

    Look, we all know that Trump's tariffs are madness and his economics make no sense to anyone who actually thinks about economics:



    But we've got to consider its internal coherence in relation to Trump's fascism. The tariffs seem mad to our rational minds because they are antithetical to the idea that economic policy is a rational exercise in managing an economy – rational economists everywhere are freaking out at the lack of economics in Trump's economics!

    But consider these two things.

    First, Trump seeks to normalise his strongman rule, and his tariffs are part of this – "clearing the decks" by wrecking norms and smashing legal barriers by decree, along with his generalised attempts to terrorise and coerce on multiple fronts by extra-judicial methods.

    Second, Trumpism and Putinism are what might be described as "hyper-neoliberalism", a decaying of neoliberal thinking where you move from a magical belief in the primacy of the market to a mystical belief everything is in unbounded competition with everything else and therefore everything is for sale and might is right. But there comes a point – as Putin so clearly demonstrates – where the difference between hyper-neoliberalism and fascism becomes so blurred, so over-lapping, as to recede to a semantic quibble.

    Now, if we accept Trump is a hyper-neoliberal/fascist in actions and inclination, even if he might be too dumb to articulate this in a coherent manner, then it follows we have to interpret his tariffs through the fascistic insistence on the subservience of economics to ideology. Further, we should remember that fascism partially cohered out of a misconstrued interpretation of the Darwinian earthquake in the 19th century. This informs a fascistic tendency to autarky rooted in that unreconstructed 19th nationalistic interpretation of political/social Darwinism because the fascist glorification of violence for it own sake ("move fast and break things") – comes with a concomitant loathing of weakness in any form, even trade deficits. Thus, economics is only interpreted in terms of, and subservient to, a fascist pothos for violent action to assert a generalised superiority.

  10. feijoa 10

    Watch NZ become a dumping ground for surplus Asian goods.

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