Trade Like You Mean It: How Aotearoa Can Lead with Values in a Volatile World

Written By: - Date published: 9:49 am, April 5th, 2025 - 36 comments
Categories: economy, exports, trade - Tags: ,

Let’s be honest: New Zealand doesn’t really do trade policy like it matters. 

We treat it like a technical issue; something for bureaucrats and exporters to handle while the rest of us focus on schools, housing, or tax. Even during elections, trade barely makes it into the conversation unless Federated Farmers are feeling ornery about staying competitive when asked to pay for the costs they impose on the rest of us via pollution and carbon emissions.

It’s seen as abstract, distant, and someone else’s job. But that attitude won’t survive the decade. Because trade: the rules that govern it, the values it carries, and the risks it exposes us to; is becoming one of the most important national conversations we’re not having.

New Zealand has built its economy on trade. Around 60% of our GDP comes from trade, and our economic story for the last few decades has been one of successful global integration: particularly in food, services, and tourism

But the environment we built that success in is unravelling. Strategic competition between the U.S. and China has weakened multilateral institutions. Tariffs are being used as political weapons. Digital borders are rising. Supply chains are being re-shored or fragmented by ideology. Climate change is redrawing the map of global production and competitiveness.

And just in case we needed a reminder of how volatile things have become, Donald Trump dropped yet another round of tariff threats this week — targeting everything from foreign cars to semiconductors. Among them: a completely spurious 10% “reciprocal” tariff on goods from New Zealand, apparently justified by what can only be described as a 19-year-old intern’s “understanding” (if we’re being extremely generous) of the balance of trade between Aotearoa and the United States.

It’s the kind of economic “logic” (again, being generous) that would get you laughed out of ECON101 — or at least gently redirected toward a different major. Something with finger puppets, crayons, and no access to sharp objects.

But in an age dominated by MAGA, it somehow becomes serious national policy.

Dropped just late enough to avoid being mistaken for a bad April Fools’ joke, the timing couldn’t be clearer: trade is now campaign rhetoric, not policy. And that puts small, export-dependent countries like ours at real risk.

In this context, our traditional approach of maximising volume over value, chasing market access, and trying to avoid controversy, is no longer fit for purpose. 

We need to shift from transactional trade, where the goal is simply to sell more, to transformational trade, where the objective is to shape enduring partnerships, set high-standard norms, and build long-term economic resilience. That begins with being more deliberate about who we trade with. 

Countries like those in the EU, Japan, Canada, and South Korea, while imperfect, still function within rules-based systems, invest in green transitions, and are open to embedding climate and labour standards in agreements. By contrast, many of our biggest markets are becoming less predictable. China now takes over 25% of our exports. A level of dependence that leaves us exposed to diplomatic and political shocks well outside our control.

We also need to reframe how we think about diversification. This isn’t about hedging. It’s about positioning. Southeast Asia, Latin America, and parts of Africa aren’t “emerging” — they’re asserting. These are regions building new trade frameworks, setting digital standards, and looking for real partnerships, not just commodities. 

If we’re not present, engaged, and offering something beyond milk powder and milquetoast free-market platitudes, we’ll be left out of the rooms where tomorrow’s rules are written.

And here’s where New Zealand has a real, and largely untapped, advantage: consistency

In a world where major economies are turning trade policy into short-term political theatre, our strength is our steadiness. We don’t have the scale to bully markets or dictate global terms, but we do have something increasingly rare: credibility. Our democratic institutions function. Our rule of law holds. Our agencies are transparent. Our politics, while messy, are not openly hostile to multilateralism. 

That kind of reliability is a strategic asset.

It means we can offer more than just product. We can offer trust. And when you embed climate action, labour rights, data privacy, and indigenous equity into your trade architecture, not just in speeches but in enforceable chapters, you’re not just exporting goods. You’re exporting stability

That makes us a partner others want when things get unpredictable. Not because we’re big, but because we’re principled and predictable.

There’s an old idea, famously championed by Immanuel Kant, that trade fosters peace: That countries economically entangled with one another are less likely to go to war. 

He wasn’t entirely right. But he wasn’t entirely wrong either. 

Trade doesn’t automatically create peace. It reflects power. It can entrench injustice as easily as it enables cooperation. And in the wrong hands, it becomes a tool of coercion, not connection. That’s why the content of our trade and the values it carries matters more than ever. It’s not about being idealistic.

It’s about being realistic in a fractured world where values are becoming the new front lines.

To get there, we need political leadership that treats trade as strategic, not procedural. We’ve had moments : our participation in the Digital Economy Partnership Agreement (DEPA), our climate and Indigenous trade commitments in the EU FTA . But these are exceptions, not evidence of a wider strategy. 

We still lack a national trade vision. 

Ministers rotate frequently. Few MPs have deep trade or foreign policy experience. And the public — through no fault of its own — is rarely invited into the conversation. MFAT does excellent work, but strategy without mandate is just management. If trade is now about geopolitics, values, and resilience, we can’t keep outsourcing it to officials working quietly behind the scenes. We need to democratise the conversation.

Trade is no longer just about price points and quotas. It’s about climate risk, data sovereignty, labour protections, and national identity. It shapes the kind of country we are. And the kind of future we’re buying into. 

We need ministers who speak the language of systems. We need business leaders who understand that long-term partnerships matter more than quarterly returns. And we need a public that sees trade policy not as some distant diplomatic chessboard — but as a real driver of our prosperity, our values, and our resilience.

Because in a world where tariffs are campaign slogans, and supply chains can collapse overnight, predictability doesn’t come from staying quiet. It comes from knowing who we are, what we stand for, and who we choose to partner with.

It’s time we talked about trade like our future depends on it.

Because it does.

Res Publica


36 comments on “Trade Like You Mean It: How Aotearoa Can Lead with Values in a Volatile World ”

  1. Ad 1

    For the most part we're a commodity producer. A small country doing what it does well and selling it cheaper than others. Better than many at it.

    We may like to be something else but 230 years of recent economic history says otherwise.

    • tWig 1.1

      Not cheaper, higher quality that takes advantage of our cheaper growing conditions for meat and dairy.

    • Res Publica 1.2

      That is very much true. But is also predicated on a global order that is stable, sane, and rules based.

      If the world continues on this trend towards protectionism, we have to try find alternative sources of competetive advantage and leverage.

  2. Dennis Frank 2

    we need a public that sees trade policy not as some distant diplomatic chessboard — but as a real driver of our prosperity, our values, and our resilience.

    Yeah, to the extent that neolib trade policy actually works, folks can be pragmatic and continue to accept that usage. Such public support doesn't come from education except for those who choose economics, but from a tacit subliminal sharing based on their standard of living. Socialising wealth from trade is traditionally the role of government.

    Yet trading is done by businesses, which are mostly private. So in the meta view of the economic system, we have normalised a public/private partnership. The state.

    History documents the evolution of this entity which rules via a constrained method of public validation. The thing rarely gets re-configured. Trump is giving us a master-class in how to reconfigure the US state, while most people still think doing so is impossible. His doctrine of reciprocity is anchored in evolutionary theory, so obviously advisors told him what to do without pointing to the fact that it is Green in essence (which would have knee-jerked him into rejecting it). Yet autonomy for a state, as for a person, is relative to operational context. Flying solo only gets you so far.

    Reframing our GST as a tariff is a topic Brian Easton ought to have a go at. Trump seems irrational doing it, yet economists have always been irrational too, so they may get in behind him. Science writers and cultural analysts are often reminding us that political leaders are normally enslaved by some dead economist, so irrationality pervades the entire system of governance and continues to drive geopolitics. We could become rational by switching from neoliberalism to resilience and sustainability, which means subordinating trade within a new paradigm. Let's do this!

    • Res Publica 2.1

      We could become rational by switching from neoliberalism to resilience and sustainability, which means subordinating trade within a new paradigm. Let's do this!

      Hilariously, neoliberalism still markets itself as the sole rational account of human economic behaviour: like it's physics. Not philosophy,

      But yes, you're absolutely reinforcing my core point: we need to reframe trade within a new paradigm that prioritises resilience and coherence, not just efficiency and growth-at-all-costs.

      And if we can steal a march on the rest of the world and be a first mover in building this kind of framework, we won’t just be better protected. We’ll be in a position to lead.

      Small can be mighty.

    • Phillip ure 2.2

      I am interested in why you don't view gst as a tariff…?

      When it clearly is…and for once the simplistic thinking by trump that gst sits between American exports and their customers here…which it does ..

      And therefore to his mind…and bowing to the dictates of logic..

      ..it is a tariff ..

      • Dennis Frank 2.2.1

        I am interested in why you don't view gst as a tariff

        Me too. I guess it reflects a general lack of equating the two in contemporary culture. If you & Trump see it that way, I'm willing to accept the equation pending the arrival of any dissenting view! smiley

      • Res Publica 2.2.2

        It comes down to intent, scope, and neutrality. Tariffs are trade tools — their purpose is to influence trade flows, raise prices on imports, and protect domestic industries. GST, by contrast, is a broad-based tax on consumption, applied uniformly to almost all goods and services consumed within the country — whether they’re imported or locally produced.

        So yes, GST does sit “between” US exporters and NZ consumers — but it also sits between NZ producers and NZ consumers. It’s not discriminating. That’s the crucial difference.

        If Trump’s logic is that any tax applied at the point of sale counts as a tariff, then by that logic, every country has tariffs on everything, always: including the US. But that’s not how WTO rules define tariffs, or how economists use the term.

        • Phillip ure 2.2.2.1

          Re 2nd to last para:..

          Trump does not care that gst does not discriminate..he just sees it as the regressive tax..(that it is)..and one that makes American goods more expensive..

          It's as simple as that..

          Re last para ..don't quite understand what you are saying there…not all countries have gst…

          ..the main one I have heard trump cite is v.a.t. in Britain..

          • Res Publica 2.2.2.1.1

            The argument I’m making is pretty simple: tariffs are designed to favour domestic producers by making foreign goods more expensive. That’s their whole point — to distort competition in favour of your own industries.

            GST (like VAT) applies to everything: imports and domestic goods alike. It’s a broad-based sales tax, not a protectionist weapon. So it doesn’t tilt the playing field at all.

            It just charges everyone for playing on it.

            Now, I get that Trump isn’t interested in that nuance. He doesn’t care whether a tax is neutral or not. He just sees a price tag on American exports and screams “unfair.” But if we start calling every sales tax a tariff just because it shows up on an invoice, then every country on Earth is suddenly protectionist. Which, oddly enough, would include the U.S.

            It’s bad policy, and worse economics.

            And pretending Trump has any kind of intelligent, cogent, or even vaguely coherent understanding of what a tariff actually is, or isn’t, feels kind of moot at this point.

  3. Macro 3

    Is it time for Fonterra et al to shift their Head Office to the Kermadecs or the Campbell Islands or Raoul?

    https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/apr/03/donald-trump-tariffs-antarctica-uninhabited-heard-mcdonald-islands

    No "trade" recorded from them on the Tump chart so should be able to sneak in unnoticed. 😉

    • Res Publica 3.1

      Or we just officially change our name to Aotearoa. Trump and his goons will probably never catch on

      • Incognito 3.1.1

        It’s not even on many World maps 😉

      • Phillip ure 3.1.2

        Heh..!….yes ..!

        I'd prefer aotearoa…it is such a satisfying word to say ..

        I seem to remember seeing a poll somewhere that showed a surprisingly (to me) large number of aotearoans who support that change…

        I think I'll just adopt it as default name . .

        ..(if enough of us do it…we could have our own gulf of America moment ..)

        And in further name-poaching from history..there is that great line in randy Newman's 'lets drop the big one now).. where he complains about/advocates nuking sth america..'cos 'they stole our name too'

        • Phillip urea 3.1.2.1

          As far as trade is concerned..

          ..we peddle animal bits and bye-products…

          ..and that's about it…

          ..as long as the world doesn't evolve beyond that mass exploitation/devouring of other species .. economically we should be ok ..

          ..if/when that evolving happens….we are pretty much f*cked…

          ..and that's about it ..

          [You might want to correct your user handle – Incognito]

  4. Drowsy M. Kram 4

    China now takes over 25% of our exports. A level of dependence that leaves us exposed to diplomatic and political shocks well outside our control.

    yes When it comes to NZ trade and values, China is an elephant in the room.

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_the_largest_trading_partners_of_New_Zealand

    https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/trade/free-trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements-in-force/nz-china-free-trade-agreement/overview

    The balance of trade with China is, however, in NZ's favour – I'm not saying we should necessarily be aiming to do more trade with China, but, while the leader of the free world is throwing trading toys out of the cot, now might not be the best time to be doing less.

    NZ should be worried about China’s trade statistics [11 Feb 2025]
    New Zealand’s trade with China is slowly contracting—Jason Young looks at the reasons for the decline and whether it will reverse.

    While it [the NZ govt] can’t wave a magic wand and fix the structural problems in the Chinese economy, nor can it influence how great powers approach global trade, it could visit Beijing and hustle to arrest the decline.

    • Tony Veitch 4.1

      yes Heard and McDonald islands – comedy gold!

    • SPC 4.2

      China is undergoing a form of retrenchment – cut back on the property sector and a decline in consumption.

      So our trade might go down a little, given we need to diversify this is not a bad thing.

      • Drowsy M. Kram 4.2.1

        So our trade might go down a little, given we need to diversify this is not a bad thing.

        Our trade with China is going down a little. This might not be a bad thing, if diversification yields returns that offset decreased trade with China – time will tell.

        Over consecutive years, the New Zealand Government has signalled to businesses the importance of maintaining a diversified portfolio of export destinations to minimise risk, including the type of political risk that impacted Australia’s exports to China. The Government has supported companies to seek opportunities in India and Southeast Asia and gone all but quiet on promoting the Chinese market.

  5. Descendant Of Smith 5

    Can we be trusted though after cancelling the ferries? As National moves further right it seems we cannot.

  6. Nic the NZer 6

    NZ has never earned anywhere near 60% of GDP for its exports. This peaked around 2000/2001 near 36% and presently sits around 26% of NZ GDP.

    Exports of NZ

    • Res Publica 6.1

      You're right: I said exports when I should have said trade.

      • weka 6.1.1

        I edited it.

        • Nic the NZer 6.1.1.1

          Not really any better though. I guess the statement is that 60% of NZs GDP is involved in trade (exports + imports). That may be true, but in terms of GDP those two terms have opposite signs.

          A meaningful statement would be that NZ trade is somewhat balanced making up around 30% of GDP (though NZ runs a trade deficit more consistently than a surplus).

          • Res Publica 6.1.1.1.1

            Shrug We can quibble over the numbers if you'd like — but the core point stands: a sizeable (and apparently debatable) chunk of our national wealth is tied to trade, especially in commodities.

            We're also heavily reliant on a small number of key export destinations, which makes us acutely vulnerable to exactly the kinds of shocks the international trade system is experiencing right now — from tariffs and supply chain breakdowns to strategic coercion.

            And when your economic model depends on goodwill from much larger, less values-aligned partners, you don’t just lose leverage — you start losing autonomy.

  7. SPC 7

    We have a problem, the current coalition has a strong leave the Paris Accord component.

    Stuff even quoted Bruce Cotterill on the need for a real Green party in an explainer – someone who would not even qualify for the National bluegreens because he opposes our being in the Paris Accord.

    This might undermine our international credibility – it infers Trumpist style isolationism from global co-operation.

    And then there is the anti-worker activism by an ACT Minister.

    https://www.ilo.org/topics-and-sectors/safety-and-health-work

    • Res Publica 7.1

      Yeah, that’s definitely a stumbling block. And exactly why we need to be having the conversation we’re not having about trade and economic policy.

      If we want credibility and resilience, we need a national consensus that can outlast election cycles. Because a trade strategy that’s hostage to political mood swings or ideological pivots isn’t really a strategy — it’s a liability.

      cough cough Trump.

      This kind of long-term positioning only works if it’s insulated from the swings and roundabouts of electoral fortune, and grounded in something broader than whatever this year’s coalition agreement happens to say.

  8. SPC 8

    The first global action would be to replace the WTO with an ITO.

    Invite the EU and EU trade partners (UK, Swiss, Norway, Turkey), OAU, Arab League, OTS, ASEAN, UNASUR, CARICOM, RCEP and TPP nations to join.

    That would leave out Ukraine, Russia, Byelorussia, non Turkic former USSR states (Armenia, Georgia), India/south Asia and non Palestine Israel (both Jewish and North American Project 2025 Zionist branches).

    Formalise WTO rules (GATT +). And then look at how to deal with US IP and services and global tax regimes on corporations (many US based) from a position of strength and unity.

    • Res Publica 8.1

      That would leave out Ukraine, Russia, Byelorussia, non Turkic former USSR states (Armenia, Georgia), India/south Asia and non Palestine Israel (both Jewish and North American Project 2025 Zionist branches).

      The problem with multilateralism is that it’s very much a “hang together or be hanged separately” kind of arrangement. It only works when it’s stable, long-term, and insulated from great power interference and geopolitical rumblings.

      Right now, none of those conditions exist.

      I’d be much more inclined to focus on regional and values-aligned coalitions: smaller, more coherent groupings that are less exposed to coercion and better able to build durable trust.

      It’s not that big-tent multilateralism is dead. It’s just that, at this point, smaller frameworks might do a better job of holding the line.

      • SPC 8.1.1

        The regional groupings already exist (barring OTS and Arab League, all trade blocks).

        The inter-group framework was/is in the WTO (now) undermined by the USA. Forming a new group – ITO, sans USA, maintains this important base.

        Note that Trump has yet to withdraw from the WTO – his purpose is to suppress its functionality.

        That tactic has to be confronted.

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